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NOTES
nation and state. The balancing test has hitherto involved the Court
in making fine decisions of economic policy, and the Court's activ-
ism in rooting out discrimination has left the states few economic
tools to effect economic and social policy. In Hughes, the Court may
be indicating that it will allow the state a wide range of discretion
in the use of certain limited policy tools. Positive incentives, such
as bounties and subsidies, might be attractive to the Court since
there are built in political limits on the use of gubgidies. After all,
bounty-subsidy money comeg out of the state budget and must com-
pete with other interests. Thus, subsidy programs must contend
with countervailing forces which do not confront discriminatory reg-
ulations or taxes. In addition, positive incentives may be felt to be
particularly suited to pursuing goals of social policy as they are often
seen as being less coercive, and hence less likely to arouse political
opposition.
By labeling the Maryland statutory scheme an exercise of its
proprietary powers and by holding such an exercise beyond the in-
tended scope of the commerce clause, the Court precluded use of
the balancing test developed under the commerce clause cases.
While it is commendable that the Court may wish to return some
measure of policy discretion to the states, it seems unfortunate that
the Court abandoned the option to review the economic impact of
policies such as Maryland's. Such policies can be disruptive of trade
and can lead to competitive retaliation. It would seem that the
"balancing test" developed under the commerce clause cases could
also be effective in reviewing state attempts to further public wel-
fare through exercise of state proprietary powers. The test was de-
signed to give important state interests their appropriate weight.
The Court should not have abandoned the test in Hughes.
RICHARD SURREY
Shutting the Federal Habeas Corpus Door
In a recent decision the Supreme Court has halted the prior
trend of increasing the scope of federal review available to state
prisoners. The case broke with a substantial history of decisions
by denying habeas corpus to state prisoners who asserted fourth
amendment violations. The author suggests that the rationale of
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the holding implies that there will be further limitations placed
upon federal review of state decisions which contain issues of
federally created rights.
State prisoners filed petitions for writs of federal habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,' alleging that unconstitutionally obtained
evidence had been admitted against them at trial in violation of
their fourth amendment rights.' Respondent Powell was found
guilty of second degree murder in a California state court; respon-
dent Rice was found guilty of first degree murder in a Nebraska
state court. In each case the state trial and appellate courts denied
that there were illegal searches and seizures and refused to apply the
exclusionary rule to the meized ovidence. Powell sought habeas cor-
pus relief from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, alleging that the vagrancy ordinance under
which he was arrested and searched was unconstitutionally vague.'
The district, court denied habeas corpus but was reversed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the ground
that the arrest was invalid and admission of the illegal evidence was
not harmless error.' Rice sought habeas corpus relief from the
1. For purposes of this article, the term "habeas corpus" (except for the historical
perspective) refers to the federal statutory writ of habeas corpps, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1970).
Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any Justice thereof, the
district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. Id. § 2241(a). The
prisoner must be in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States under
color of authority in a state or federal jurisdiction. Id. § 2241(c). If a state prisoner petitions
for relief, he must be in custody in violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty of the
United States and have exhausted his state remedies without finding relief. Id. §2254 (a), (b).
Habeas corpus in the historical perspective refers to the common-law writ of habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.).
2. The fourth amendment assures that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... U.S. CONST. amend.
IV.
3. Powell was arrested for violation of a Henderson, Nevada vagrancy ordinance which
provides:
Every person is a vagrant who: (1) Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from
place to place without apparent reason or business and (2) who refuses to identify
himself and to account for his presence when asked by any police officer to do so
(3) if surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that
the public safety demands such identification.
96 S. Ct. at 3039 n.1.
The search incident to Powell's arrest produced a gun which was used to convict him of
second degree murder. Id. at 3040.
4. Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974).
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United States District Court for Nebraska, alleging that the war-
rant which authorized the search of his home was issued without
probable cause.' The district court granted Rice relief and was af-
firmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit.6 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held, re-
versed: When the state has provided an opportunity for a full and
fair hearing of a fourth amendment claim, a state prisoner will not
be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at
his trial. Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
The main purpose of a prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is to gain immediate relief from illegal confinement. The
petition tests whether the prisoner has been deprived of his liberty
without due process.7 Federal habeas relief is available to a state
prisoner only when the prisoner alleges he is being restrained in
violation of the Constitution or some law or treaty of the United
States.8 The right to petition for habeas corpus is one of the few
personal rights specifically enumerated in the Constitution.9 The
writ's function as guardian of individual liberty has made it the
vehicle to the Supreme Court for many criminal justice problems
and today makes it the subject of a raging judicial battle.
The history of habeas corpus has followed the ebb and flow of
power between the federal government and the states.10 Colonial
Americans viewed habeas corpus as the fundamental common law
right to inquire into the legality of detention; that is, whether con-
finement was imposed without proper legal process or by courts
lacking jurisdiction." The Judiciary Act of 1789 codified the com-
5. The search warrant was held invalid because the supporting affidavit did not meet
the Aguilar-Spinelli test. 96 S. Ct. at 3041. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Police found, in plain view, evidence used to convict
Rice of first degree murder.
6. Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975), afrg 388 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1974).
7. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970).
9. "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion, the Public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9 cl. 2. For a discussion of the constitutional history of habeas corpus, see Chafee,
The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U.L. REv. 143 (1952); Paschal,
The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605, 607-17.
10. See Miller & Shepherd, New Looks at an Ancient Writ: Habeas Corpus Reexamined,
9 U. RICH. L. REV. 49 (1974).
11. Id. at 52.
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mon law writ.'2
After the Civil War the Court began to expand the writ's
scope-partly because of deficiencies in the Court's power to review
federal convictions. By 1867, Congress had vested federal courts
with jurisdiction to entertain state prisoners' petitions for writs of
habeas corpus.'3 As due process concepts evolved over the next three
generations, so did the scope of constitutional rights. Federal court
review centered on two theories. First, federal collateral review was
necessary to assure that constitutional issues were correctly decided
by state courts, unprejudiced by the question of guilt or innocence.
Second, federal judges were best suited to decide constitutional is-
sues because of their expertise and because they were removed from
public pressure."
The propriety of federal court review for state prisoners was
decided in the 1953 case of Brown v. Allen.'5 The Supreme Court
held that federal courts have authority to review claims of denial
of federal rights already litigated by the state forum where federal
constitutional issues are presented, and that this could be done
without initial resort to the adequacy of state process. Furthermore,
the federal judge could hold an evidentiary hearing and make new
findings of fact. The Court's rationale was that it had a duty to
protect federal constitutional rights.'"
In 1963, the Warren Court decided three cases which greatly
expanded the availability of habeas corpus relief for state prisoners.
In Fay v. Noia'7 and Townsend v. Sain' the Court formulated the
rule that "habeas corpus may be invoked by a state prisoner, after
12. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 193, 201-02 (1830). This Act extended only to prisoners held in custody by the United
States.
13. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 14, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(1970)). This Act was limited to state criminal proceedings in which cognizable issues of
common law habeas corpus existed. See Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Su-
preme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CI. L. REV. 31 (1965).
14. See Carroll, Habeas Corpus Reform: Can Habeas Survive the Flood, 6 CuM. L. REV.
363 (1975).
15. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
16. Id. at 474. Brown had a delayed reaction because its companion case, Daniels v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), held that the prisoner had waived his constitutional claims by
failing to assert them in accordance with state law (he had not perfected his appeal) and his
custody was, therefore, not "in violation of the Constitution." Id. at 485.
17. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
18. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
[Vol. 31:735
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the exhaustion of available state remedies, to review alleged viola-
tions of federal constitutional claims in state criminal proceedings,
regardless of any prior state court determinations of those rights."' 9
Townsend compelled federal district courts to hold full evidentiary
hearings if any of the several conditions were present, including the
lack of a full and fair state hearing. 0 The third case, Sanders v.
United States,2 established that the traditional notion of finality in
criminal cases would not prevent reapplication for federal habeas
corpus relief. Together these cases established that a prisoner bring-
ing a federal habeas corpus petition was entitled to multiple, inde-
pendent, federal determination of his constitutional claims on both
procedural and substantive grounds.
The development of federal rights and their protection contin-
ued in 1969, when Kaufman v. United States" held that fourth
amendment claims could be raised by federal prisoners seeking re-
lief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.23 The Court reasoned that the scope of
habeas corpus since 1867 had included all constitutional claims and
that the purpose of section 2255 had not been to cut back the scope
of review for federal prisoners, but rather, it was intended to mini-
mize difficulties in obtaining a forum. The Court found no signifi-
cant difference between the rights of federal and state prisoners to
19. Miller & Shepherd, supra note 10, at 59; see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312
(1963).
20. Townsend held that a
federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant under the
following circumstances: If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved
in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported
by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state
court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial
allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not ade-
quately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that
the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact
hearing.
(1) There cannot even be the semblance of a full and fair hearing unless the
state court actually reached and decided the issues of fact tendered by the defen-
dant.
372 U.S. at 313. For the codification of this rule, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970).
21. 373 U.S. 1 (1963). Sanders allowed a rehearing to be held unless the prior federal
proceeding met three criteria: (1) issues presented were identical; (2) the decision was made
on the merits at an evidentiary hearing; and (3) justice would not be served by reviewing the
merits of the subsequent application. Id. at 15-17.
22. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) authorizes federal prisoners to use a simplified procedure
for obtaining relief from illegal detention.
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assert fourth amendment violations on collateral attack. This rapid
expansion of federal due process and equal protection rights under
the Warren Court stimulated strong political reaction. Critics con-
tended that there was a flood of petitions clogging federal courts,
that the finality of criminal judgments was disturbed, and that
friction was created between federal and state courts. 24
The Burger Court has moved to check this expansion, and the
net effect has been to limit state prisoner's accessability to federal
habeas corpus relief.25 In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte21 the majority
disposed of the fourth amendment claim on the merits. Mr. Justice
Powell, concurring, suggested a substantial judicial restructuring of
federal habeas corpus relief. He argued that since claims of uncon-
stitutional searches do not concern the reliability of the questioned
evidence, and the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is not
served by permitting collateral attack, such claims should not be
allowed habeas review. Absent a colorable claim of innocence, the
sole question in fourth amendment habeas cases should be "whether
the petitioner was provided a fair opportunity to raise and have
adjudicated the question [his constitutional claim] in state
courts."27 Mr. Justice Powell argued that the habeas corpus statute
should be reinterpreted by balancing the interest in insuring that
justice is done through habeas relief against the costs of having that
forum available.
Schneckloth left open the question of whether federal courts
would continue to entertain habeas corpus petitions raising fourth
amendment claims. Stone v. Powell answers that question in the
negative. Fourth amendment violations can no longer be asserted
on collateral attack unless the state failed to give a full and fair
hearing. The Court in Stone divides its argument between its view
of the history and purpose of habeas corpus and the history and
purpose of the exclusionary rule.2" The 6-3 decision delivered by Mr.
24. Carroll, supra note 14, at 372; Doub, The Case Against Modern Federal Habeas
Corpus, 57 A.B.A.J. 323 (1971); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CI. L. REV. 142 (1970); Santarelli, Too Much Is Enough, 9 TRIAL,
May/June 1973, at 40.
25. Miller & Shepherd, supra note 10, at 70.
26. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
27. Id. at 250 (Powell, J., Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring). See Friendly,
supra note 24.
28. The history of the exclusionary rule and its relationship to the fourth amendment
are of importance to Stone's decision but are not the subject of this article. For discussions
[Vol. 31:735
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Justice Powell demonstrates strong hostility toward both protec-
tions.2
Stone v. Powell asserts that habeas was historically limited to
inquiries into the jurisdiction of a court to confine a prisoner2' The
Court acknowledges both the expansion of the scope of habeas cor-
pus 3' and the current jurisdiction of district courts to hear fourth
amendment petitions," but holds that the discretion to do so is
restricted to procedural inquiries.3 It finds authority for this discre-
tionary restriction in the equitable nature of habeas corpus as recog-
nized in Frank v. Manguma4 and Fay v. Noia. 5
The Court reasons that during the expansion of the substantive
scope of the writ, the Supreme Court failed to exercise its discretion
to limit full review for particular categories of constitutional claims.
However, the Court acknowledges that prior to Kaufman v. United
States,3 1 a substantial majority of the federal courts37 did make ex-
ceptions to full review and found collateral review of fourth amend-
of the exclusionary rule's history, purpose, and effectiveness, see Canon, Is the Exclusionary
Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky.
L.J. 681 (1974); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974);
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CI L. REV. 665 '(1970);
Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable
Blunders, 50 TEx. L. REV. 736 (1972); Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations
of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra.
69 Nw. U.L. REV. 740 (1974).
29. Mr. Justice Powell was joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Rehncuist and Ste-
vens. Mr. Chief Justice Burger filed a concurring opinion. Mr. Justice Brennan filed a dissent -
ing opinion in which Mr. Justice Marshall joined. Mr. Justice White filed a dissenting
opinion. Three other opinions filed the same day as Stone limited the efficacy of the exclu-
sionary rule. See United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct..3021 (1976) (noted in 31 U. Miami L.
Rev.-(1977)); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976).
30. 96 S. Ct. at 3042.
31. Id. at 3042-44.
32. Id. at 3045.
33. Id. at 3052.
34. 237 U.S. 309 (1915). Frank recognized federal habeas relief if the state had failed to
provide a full and fair litigation, regardless of the propriety of the state's jurisdiction.
35. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Fay compelled federal courts to consider the merits of almost
all federal constitutional claims. It also recognized the equitable nature of habeas relief if the
petitioner had deliberately bypassed orderly state procedures on direct review. The holdings
in Fay and Frank expanded the scope of habeas relief. This appears in direct conflict with
the Court's current use of them as authority for restriction.
36. 394 U.S. 217, 225 (1969); see note 22 supra and accompanying text.
37. See the cases cited by the Court, 96 S. Ct. at 3044.
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ment violations inappropriate under section 2255. The rationale was
that fourth amendment claims are "different in kind from denials
of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in that claims of illegal search
and seizure do not 'impugn the integrity of the fact-finding process
or challenge evidence as inherently unreliable . . . .' "' While the
Court rejected this rationale in Kaufman, the Stone v. Powell
Court finds it persuasive.
The thrust of the Court's argument regarding the purpose of
habeas corpus is that in order to invoke collateral relief, a convicted
defendant should assert a constitutional claim bearing on inno-
cence.3" Kaufman is reexamined and effectively overruled. Mapp v.
Ohio4 ' is interpreted as requiring exclusion of unconstitutionally
gathered evidence at trial and reversal of conviction upon direct
review of such evidence is admitted.
The Court draws a dividing line between direct review and
discretionary collateral review." It concludes that the Constitution
does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas
corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.4 The
Court is able to reach this conclusion by limiting the rationale for
Mapp's exclusionary rule to deterrence of police misconduct.43 The
history of the exclusionary rule is interpreted as that of "a judicially
created means of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment."44 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States45 which
is considered the origin of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine,
is only discussed parenthetically. The Court undermines judicial
38. 96 S. Ct. at 3044, citing Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 224 (1969).
39. 96 S. Ct. at 3044 & n.1l.
40. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule is
an essential part of the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed
by the fourth and fourteenth amendments. "[Alli evidence obtained by searches and sei-
zures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state
court." Id. at 655.
41. 96 S. Ct. at 3051.
42. Id. at 3046, 3048.
43. Id. at 3047.
44. Id. at 3046.
45. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). In Silverthorne the Supreme Court held that information ob-
tained from an illegal search cannot be used as the basis for a subpoena of documents. Justice
Holmes wrote: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain
way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it
shall not be used at all." Id. at 392.
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integrity" as a basis for the rule, and finds that the concern for
judicial integrity "has limited force as a justification for the exclu-
sion of highly probative evidence."47 Post-Mapp cases are cited
which hold that the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right.4"
Stone emphasizes that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter police misconduct. As a deterrent, the Court reasons, it is a
remedial device and should be restricted to those areas where its
remedial objectives are best served.
The Court relies heavily on the rationale of United States v.
Calandra.4" In Calandra, the Court decided that a grand jury wit-
ness may not refuse to testify because the questions asked are based
on information obtained from him in an unlawful search. The Court
balanced the potential injury to the historic role and function of the
grand jury against the potential contribution to the effectuation of
the fourth amendment through deterrence of police misconduct. In
applying this balancing approach to collateral review of fourth
amendment claims, the Stone Court gives weight to the costs of
application including diversion from the ultimate question of guilt
or innocence, the exclusion at trial of reliable evidence, the freeing
of guilty parties, and the resulting disrespect for the law.5
Stone v. Powell adheres to the utility of the exclusionary rule
on direct appeal as in Mapp v. Ohio,5" but the Court decides that
police misconduct is not effectively deterred by determining fourth
amendment issues on collateral review. The rationale that the ex-
clusionary rule is a judicial device for deterring constitutional viola-
tions, as opposed to a constitutional ingredient of the fourth amend-
ment, is fundamental to the decision.
In a strong dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan argues that the signifi-
cance of Stone is the closing of a federal forum for vindicating feder-
ally guaranteed rights." The rationale that relief should be denied
46. For a discussion of judicial integrity, see Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial
Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
1129 (1973).
47. 96 S. Ct. at 3047. Two Justices would limit the scope of the exclusionary rule to bad
faith conduct. Id. at 3055 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 3072 (White, J., dissenting).
48. See the cases cited by the Court, id. at 3048.
49. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). For a discussion of Calandra and the exclusionary rule, see
Adelson, Criminal Procedure, 1974 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. 153.
50. 96 S. Ct. at 3049-52.
51. Id. at 3049-51.
52. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
53. 96 S. Ct. at 3056.
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for constitutional violations other than those which are "guilt-
related" could well be extended. An expansion of the Stone ration-
ale might include restrictions on claims of double jeopardy, entrap-
ment, self-incrimination, Miranda" warnings, and use of invalid
identification procedures."
No guidelines are given for the determination of what a full and
fair hearing might mean." In the instant case, Powell was arrested
pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutionally vague city ordinance.
The record does not explain why the trial judge rejected this allega-
tion, and the state appellate court failed to address this issue. Thus
Powell's hearing was deficient under the statutory standards 5 for
lack of a full and fair hearing. In Rice's case, the state upheld a
supporting affidavit for an arrest warrant that both federal courts
found deficient under prevailing constitutional standards."
In Stone v. Powell the Burger Court has limited the
constitutional safeguards previously guaranteed criminal defen-
dants. The rationale portends further restrictions on habeas corpus
jurisdiction and decreasing federal review of state criminal proceed-
ings. While the majority exhibits its growing trust in the ability of
state courts to apply federal constitutional principles, it also implic-
itly encourages strong criminal prosecution. The time of concern for
due process in criminal cases has passed, and the time of crime
control appears at hand.
SUZAN HILL PONZOLI
54. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
55. 96 S. Ct. at 3062-63.
56. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970); see notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
58. 96 S. Ct. at 3041-42.
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